Read the long-classified '28 pages' on alleged Saudi ties to 9/11

The 34-page document, which includes the 28 redacted pages that discuss a possible Saudi role in the terrorist plot, was released by Congress on Friday. The pages were part of a 2002 congressional investigation into the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Congress releases long-classified ‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi ties to 9/11

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Congress at the Urinr?teir ?rmed
medium. 3.6.

January 29. 2003

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. DC 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As you know. the final report of the Joint inquiry into the events of September 11
has been submitted to the intelligence Community for declassi?cation review. We look

forward to early release of the public report so that e?orts at reforms can be
accelerated.

Having been privileged to lead this bipartisan. bicameral investigation last year.
we are committed to working in the current Congress to help secure implementation of
its recommendations. in furtherance of that goal. we are writing to the President and
heads of departments and agencies about portions of the Joint Inquiry?s
recommendations that may be of particular ooncem to them.

Our ?rst recommendation calls for establishment of a Director of National
intelligence. or who in addition to being the President's principal intelligence
adviser ?shatl have the full range oi management. budgetary and personnel
responsibilities needed to make the us. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent
whole: To help promote both strong leadership of the entire Intelligence Community
leadership and an effective CIA. the Joint inquiry also recommended that Congress
provide that the DNI not simultaneously serve as director of the or any other
agency. in considering this recommendation. the Congress will certainly, we believe.
bene?t from learning of yourviews about the strengthening oi the role of head or the
Intelligence Community.

A number at the recommendations that follow address proposed tasks of the
Director of National intelligence, but as that reform will require study and deliberation.
for the immediate future those further recommendations are directed to the Director of
Central intelligence as the present statutory head of the Intelligence Community.

The Joint inquiry found that prior to September 11 neither the 0.5. Government
as a whole nor the intelligence Community had a comprehensive countenen'orist
strategy. One of our recommendations calls on the National Security Couno'l. in
conjunction with key agency and department heads. to prepare such a strategy for the
President?s approval. The recommendation states that the strategy should be

The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29. 2003
Page 2

"government wide.? apply both ?home and abroad.? and include 'the growing tenorism
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated
technologies.? The recommendation asks that this strategy identify and fully engage the
intelligence as well as foreign policy. economic. military and law enforcement elements
that are ?critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism.?
The Director of Central lnteiligence's full participation in this overall process will be
essential. as will the DCl's development of the Intelligence Community component of
the full strategy. The Joint inquiry recommended that the intelligence Community?s
component of the overall strategy include a number of important items. among them
develOpment of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks.

To provide to the Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intelligence
estimates on terrorism. the Joint inquiry has recommended establishment on the
National Intelligence Council of the position of National intelligence Officer for
Terrorism. The recommendation suggests that the person holding this position also
assist the intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic analysis.

Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the
Administration to ensure development within the Department of Homeland Sewrity of
an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center. as mandated by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. The success of that fusion center will depend, as the
recommendation states, on the center?s ?full and timely access to all counterterrorism-
related intelligence information. including 'ravr' supporting data as needed.? Your action
to ensure full cooperation between the entire intelligence Community (including, of
course. the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Security will be fundamental to the
success of this vital reform. We applaud the President's announcement of the
establishment of a new Terrorist Threat integration Center. which we understand will be
located under the Director of Central intelligence. The important challenge, we believe.
is to assure the full and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion
requirement of the Homeland Security Act and the center that the President announced.

The recommendations include a list of signi?cant reforms that the intelligence
Committees believe are essential for strengthening the FBI's domestic intelligence
capability. in regard to these critically needed reforms. the Joint inquiry has
recommended that Congress should direct that the head of the Intelligence Community.
together with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. should
report to Congress on the FBI's progress. The report should include 'the speci?c
manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the United

The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29. 2003
Page 3

States. recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil
liberties.?

The Committees expressed their strong conviction that ?the Intelligence
Community's employees remain its greatest resource.? They recommend that the head
of the Intelligence Community "should require that measures be implemented to greatly
enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and
expertise needed for success in countenerrorlst efforts.? Several particular actions are
set forth in the recommendation. One is that intelligence Community agencies should
expand and improve counterterrorism training. including about information sharing
among law enforcement and intelligence personnel. the use of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. and watchiisting. The recommendation includes steps to improve
Intelligence Community language capabilities and the utilization of the skills and
experience of retired personnel. It calls on the Intelligence Community to ?enhance
recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce.?

A further personnel recommendation proposes, in part. that Congress enact
legislation. modeled on the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986. to help instill the concept of ?jointness? throughout the
intelligence Community and ensure that its components will work more closely together
than has been the case. The mechanisms identified in the recommendation include
such things as joint tours for intelligence and law enforcement personnel as well as
incentives for joint service throughout the Intelligence Community. In developing these
ideas. Congress would benefit from the Administration?s detailed proposals.

The Joint Inquiry identi?ed several important objectives concerning classi?ed
information. including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Intelligence
Community. by state and local authorities. and by the American public. To this end. we
recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence. in consultation with the heads of
key components of the Intelligence Community. including the Attorney General. should
report to the Intelligence Committees on ?proposals for a new and more realistic
approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of
sensitive and classified information.? The report should also address 'proposals to

protect against the use of the classi?cation process as a shield to protect agency self-
interest.?

The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and
response to these and other matters identi?ed in the course of the Joint Inquiry.
Further. we are con?dent that the Congress will benelit from other recommendations

The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29. 2003
Page 4

that you might have for legislative or administrative action to improve the Nation's
oounterterrorist capabilities.

Sincerely.

Bob Graham Porter

Chairman. Senate Intelligence Chairmen. House Intelligence
Committee. 107m Congress Committee. 107?? and 108?"

Congresses
a a
Richard Shelby Nancy Pelosl
Vice Chairman. Senate Intelligence Ranking Minority Member. House

Committee. 107'? Congress Intelligence Committee. 107'? Congress

and Member ex article (as Minority
Leader). 108? Congress

Enclosure: As stated

REPT N0. 107- 107?? CONGRESS, 20 SESSION H. No.

INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRO RIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

REPORT
OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. ON INTELLIGENCE
AND
U.S. HOE-SE PERMANENT SELECT ON
INTELLIGENCE

TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS

DECEMBER 2002

WI Dew?-

PART FOUR-FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE. REGARDING CERTAIN
SENSITFVE SECURITY MATTERS

20. Findinu: "While in the Ifnitcd States, some of the Septetnher 11 hijackers were in

contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected in
the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI Sources, that tit least five
ofthuse individuals Were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence of?cers. The Joint
Inquiry?s review con?rmed that the intelligence Community also has int'ormution, much of
which has yet to be independently verified. indicating that individuals associated with the
Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qn?ida and other terrorist
groups. The FBI and CIA have. inl?ormed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September ll
attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only a limited
understanding of the Saudi Government's ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony,
neither CIA nor FBI witnesses were able to identify de?nitively the extent of Saudi support
for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such
support. if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. The FBl?s Washington Field
Of?ce created a squad devoted to

ow and
at least in part due to the Joint Inquiry?s locus on this issue, did the FBI and CIA establish
a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view of the Joint Inquiry, this gap in
11.8. intelligence coverage is unacceptahle, given the magnitude and immediacy of the
potential risk to U.S. national security. The Intelligence Community needs to address this

area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible.

Discussion: One reason for the limited understanding is that it we: only aftzr September
11 that U1: US. Government began to agges'sivcly investigate thin issue. Prior to September

the FBI apparently did not focus investigative rcso arees on?

Saudi nationals in the Unitm? Slates due to Saudi Ambia's status as an American

.

September 11. 2001, the FBI received "no reporting from ofthe intelligence
Community? that there was a - presence in the Inith States.

According to various Bl documents and at least one CIA memorandum, some of the
September 1 I hijackers, while in the L'nited States, apparently had contacts with individuals
may be connected to the Saudi Govumntent. While the Iomt inquiry uncovered this material
during the course of its review oft-131 and CIA documents, it did not attempt to investigate and
assess the accuracy and signi?cance of this information hidependently, recogniting that such a
task would be beyond the scope at this Jomt anuiry. Instead, the Jomt inquiry rcterrcn
detailed compilatiou of information uncoverm by the inquiry in documents and interviews to the
and CIA for further investigation by the Intelligence Community and, if appropriate. law
enforcement agencies. A brief summary of the available informaan regarri'mg some ot'thesc

individuals is illustrative for purposes of this report:

- Omar al-Bayoumi. The FBI has received numerous reports from individuals tn the
Muslim enmmunity, dating back to 1999, alleging that al-Bayoumi may be a Saudi
intelligence of?cer. FBI ?les suggeSt that al-Bayoumi provided substantial assistance to
hijackers Khaiid al-Mihdiiar and Nawaf al-Hazmi after they arri"ed in San Diego in
February 20110. Al-Bayounu? met the hijackers at a public place shortly after his meeting
with an individual at the Saudi consulate and there are indications in the ?les that his
encounter with the hijackers may not have been accidental. During this same timefrazue,
al?Bayoumi had extensive Contact with Saudi Government establislunents :31 the United
States and received ?nancial support from a Saudi company af?liated with the Saudi
Ministry ofDefensn. According to FBI files,- at the company said that al-
Bayo utni received a salary even though he had been there on only one occasion
This support increased substantially in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived
in 32:1 Diego. decreasod in December 2000. and Stayed at thru same level until
August 2001. That company reportedly had 1th to Usama Bin Lariin and ni-Qa'idu. in
addition. the l-?Bl determined that al-Bayounti Was in contact with several individuals
under FBI investigation and with Lhe Holy Land Foundation, which has been under

investigation asa fundraising ?our for llamas;

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- Osama Bassnan. Bassnan may Imvc in contact wu'n al?Miitdher and ?i?HEL'mi
dui?iny their time in San Diego. Bassnan was a closo assouizue of aE?Buyoumi and Omar
Bakarbashat, another one of the hijackers' close BSDIZIEICS. He also lide across the:
street from the hijackers, and made a to an FBI now: that he did. more than ai?
Bayounti did for the According to an FBI document. Basnan told another
individual that he met al-Hazmi through al?Baynmn? and lat-:r that he met two of the
hijackers through al-Bayoumi. He also told the asset that al-Bayoumi was atestrci
because he knew a} Unzni and nl-Ivfihcihtu' vary wall. The document 50:35 no to state that
Bassnan and al-Bayoumi haw: be: "close to each other for a iong lec Bassnan has
many tics to th: Saudi including past employment by the Saudi Ambim:
Education Mission, rcfenud to in FRI documents as
The FBI also reports from
individuals in the: Muslim community alleging that Bassnan might be a Saudi
of?cu: According to a CIA mcmo, Bassoon ?nding and possibly a
fake: passport from Saudi Government officials. Ho and his wife have r"mamial
support from In: Saudi Ambassador to the United States and witc A CIA report also
indicates that Bassoon travaicd to Houston in 2002 and mat with an individual who was.

- The report stats: that during that trip :1 mombcr of the Saudi Royal? Family
provided Bassuan wiih :1 signi?cant amount of cash. FBI mfommtion indicata: that
Bassoon is an extremist and supponcr ostnma Em Ladin, and has been connected to 111:

Eritrean lslamic Jihad and Blind Shaykh;

- Shayl?t al-Thtunairy. According to FBI documents and a CIA memorandum. al-lIthnti
and :tl-Mihdhar may have bcnu in contact with Shaykh an accredited
diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in L0: Angels: and one oflhr. ?imams.? at the King
Fahad mosque in Culvcr City. California. Also according to PEI documents. It: mosque
wits built in 1995 from funding provided by Saudi Arabia's Crown Pnnco Abduluzxz.
The mosque is reportedly attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Ar.

is widely recognizizd for its anti-Westnm views;

I
~17

- Snleh al-llussayen. 11?. September 2001. Saleh aI?Hussayen. reportedly rt Saudi Interior
Ministry official. stayed at the same hotel in Hemdou. Virginia where al-Hazmi was
staying. While nl-Hussayen claimed after September 11 not to know the hijackers. FBI
agents believed he was being deceptive. He was able to depart the Lnitw States despite

FBI efforts to locate and rc-intewiew hint; and

0 Abdullah 3m Ledin. Abdullah Ladin claims to work for the Saudi Embassy
Washington, DC. as an ndntimattativt: officer. He is identi?ed by the FBI as Home Din
Ladin's halfbrot'ner. He ts a close friend Qttadir-llarunani, a possible

associate of Molzamrned Atta and al-Sltehhi prior to September 1 l, 2001.

The Joint Inquiry also found other indteations that individuals connected to the Saudi

Government have ties to terrorist networks. including:

- The and FBI have identi?ed the Pan Tarmyeh Mosque in Culver City as a. site of
extremist-relnted activity. Several FBI investigattons prior to September ll
had close connections to the mosque and are believed to have laundered money throth
this mosque to non-pro?t organizations overseas af?liated with USmta Btu Ladin. In an
interview. an FBI :1ng said he believed that Saudi Government money was being

laundered through the mosque;

- Another Saudi national with time ties to the Saudi Royal Family.-. is the
subject of FBI eounterterronsm investigations and reportedly was checking security at
the United States? southwest border in 1999 and discussing the possibility of in?ltrating
individuals into the United States;

0 According to documents. several ofthe phone found tn the phatte book of
Aim Zu'eeidn. a Senior al-Qe?ida operative captured In Pakistan in March 2002. could be
linked, at least indirectly. to telephone numbers in the United States. One of those US.

numbers is subscribed to by the ASPCOL Corporation. which is located in Aspen.

Colorado, and manages the affairs ofthe Colorado :ii'the Saudi Ambassador
Bandits. The FBI noted that ASPCOL has an unlisted telephone number. A November
18, 2002 FBI responsr. to the Joint Inquiry states that LA traces have revealed no direct
links bcm'ecn numbers found in Zu'naida's phone book and numbers in the United
Stores."

- According to an FBI document, the telephone number ofa bodyguard at the Saudi

Embassy in Washington, DC, who some have alleged may be a?
WILS also Found it: Abu Zubnidu'r. possetzsions; and

- According to an FBI agent tn Phoenix. the FBI suspects Moltemmud al-Qudhaecin of
heing_ Al-Qudhaecirt was involved in 1999 incident aboard
an America West ?ight, which the [5151's Phoenix of?ce now suspects may have been a.
?dry run" to test airline security. During the flight. el-Quditaeein and his associate. asked
the ?ight attendants. a variety of suspicious questions; al-Qudltaeein that: attempted to
enter the cockpit on two occasions. Al-Qurlhacein and his associate were: ?ying to
Washington, C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy, and both claimed that their
tickets were paid for by the Saudi Embassy. During the course oi'its investigations, the
FBI has discovered that both al-Qudhaeein and the other individual involved in this

incident had connections to terrorism

Finally, the Committees are particularly concerned about the Serious mum of allegation:
contained in a CIA memorandum found by the Joint inquiry Staff in tne ?les of in: 1781's San
Diego Field Of?ce That memorandum, which discusses alleged ?neneral cemectioas between
the September 1 hijackers. Saudi Government officials, and members of the S?udt Royal
Family. was drafted by :1 CIA of?cer?, relying primarily on
information from FBI ?les. The CIA otther sent it to the CTC to determine whether CIA had
additional information. lit: 2.150 provided a copy to the FBI agent resporisible tor the
:nvestigattou at one drive individuals discussed in the memorandum. Dtspitc the clear national
implications of the CIA memorandum. the FBI agen: included the memorandum: in art trtdit idua'.

case ?le and did not forward 1110 FBI Headquarters. FBI Headquarters, therefore, we". ttnuwm:

I album?mm? 419

in the memormtdum until Joint Inquiry brought the mcmor?mdmt's

mnncanws to me Bureau's

Possible Saudi Government Connuctious to Tcrrurisu and Terrorist Groups

While in the United States, 50m: oi'tltt: 1 hijackers war: in contact with, and
:zceivcc' support or assistance from, individuals who may he: the Saudi
Guvmumcnt. is mforznatzuu, ftuut FBI autumn?, that at luaat twu ut'thuac
alleged to Saud: Of?cers. The JOtnt lnqutry's review con?rmed that tht:
also has 'tnfonmttion, much of which rcmuins speculative and gut to bc
vcri?cd, indicating that Saudi Government of?cials 11: the United 55 :22. may have

other ties to and other terrorist groups.

Th: Corrunittecs are particula: ly about the scriaus namrc of allegations
contamcd in a CIA memorandum found within the ?les ofthc FBI's San Du:ij Field Of?ce
That memorandum, which discusses alleged ?nancial connect-.0115 the 1

hijackers. Saudi Government of?cials, and members af?ne Saudi Raydl Family, was drafted by a

CIA of?ccr?. ralymg pnmarily on intent-nation from FBI ?les;

In their testimony I'm: Joint Inquiry, the: CM nor the FBI was ablu In
dc?uitivcly f0: Cummimzcs d1: extent ot'Saudi support for tct?turist .tctivity
globally or within the United States and the extent to which such suppor.. iFlt exists, is
intentional or innocent in nature. Both FBI and CIA have indicath to that

they are now aggressively pursuing Saudi-rclatcd issues.

Prior to September the FBI apparently did not focus investigativ-
_Swdi
1h: United States due to Saudi .kabia's status an; an American "ally".?
A reprcsentativc oft'nc FBI's testi?ed in cloud

'1
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Leeri rigs that, prior to September 1 the FBI received "no reporting from any member of the

intelligence Community" that there is a presence in the United States-

it should be clear that this Joint lnquiry has made no final detenninations :5 to the
reliability or suf?ciency ofthc information regarding these issues that we found contained in FBI
and cm documents. It was not the test: of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive
investigation that Would be required to determined the true signi?cance nfany such alleged
connections to the Saudi Govemnent. On the one hand. it is possible :hat these lands of
connections could suggesr. es indicate] in a? dc.ch Jul) 2. 2002,
"incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists within the: Saudi
Governmizot." On the other hand, it is also possible that further inxestigation ot?t?nes:

could reveal legitimate. and innocent, explanations for these associations.

Given the serious national security implications ol'tliis information, however. the
leadership of the Joint Inquiry is referring the staff's compilation rc.evant information to both
inc F33 and the CIA for investigative rcview anti appropriate investigative and intelligence

action

Pussihlc Connections Between the September 11 Hijackers and Saudi Government Of?cials
in the United States

In reviewing FBI documents and the CIA memorandum, the Joint Inquiry Steffhas

examined information suggesting that:

- One individual who wounded assistance to Nawnt'al Haemi and Khalid may
he cunnezted Lo the Saudi A second individual may have been in
contact With al-l lazmi and Al-Mihdhar also has ties to the Saudi including
connections to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. them is reporting in FBI ?les
met persons have alleged that both of these individuais may be Saudi intelligence

of?cers;

3).

- The September I I hijackers may have been in contact With other Saudi Governmen:

officials in the United States prior to the September 11 attacks; and

- Saudi Government of?cmls in the United States may have ties to L-?sama 23in Ladm's

terrorist nont'crk.

Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan

Two individnuis known to the FE: pnor to September ii, 2001 - Omar al-Bayeumi and
Osama Bil?SIl'dl'l may have provided or support to al-Hazmi and ul-Mtinthar while the
two hijacluzers?to-bc were living in San Diego. While the documentary evidence that al-Bnyomni
provided assistance to al-itazmi and al-Mihdhar t3 solid. the ?les contain only limited evidence

that Osamn Bassnan had contacts with the two individuals.

When :Ll-Hazmi md al-Mihdhar rim-.ch to San Diego, al-Bayoumi provider! them with
considerable assistance. Before th: hijackers moved in with the long~timc FBI informant. they
stayed at al-Buyoumi's apartment for several days until ai-Bayoun? wot. (?512 to find them an
apartment. Al?Bnyuumi then (to-signed [hth lease and may have paid their 51:3: month?s rent and
security deposit.l After :iI-Iiazmi and zl?Mihdhar moved into their own apartment. nl-Tiayoiimi
threw a party to wetcomc them to the San Diego wrmnurdty He also nutkcd Mndhar Ahdullah,
another individual from the Islamic Cantu: ofSan Diego (ICSD). to help them get acclimated to

the United States. Aooullah served as their translator, helped thorn get tlrivcrs' linenses, and

assiswd mm 'm nigh:

The FBE nets, in its November 1.5. 20G: response that "financial remrds Indicate a cam deposit of the
mnount as the cashier's check tnto Al-Payonni hank account on the same day, which suggest; that the hijacker:
mathurscd him" FBI November 18 Response. 3. Ecwcvar, another FBI document, dazed October 14,2603,
appears to reach a stightiy different This document states that rtvucw ct'ICnaiid and
Nawnf bank :ecords indicate than: is no bank do.:urr.cntatinn "tel support; the offt'u:
rent magi}, or any monies to Omar Al-Bayourm from al-Hazmi or AI-Midhar."

1W anew?HMO!? 433?-

Dating the t] investigation, the: FBI discovered that .tI-Bayoumi had for
mom: extensive ties to the Saudi than previously rcalizcdt In fact, according to at:
Octobcr 14, 2002 FBI document, ui-Bayoumi has tics lo the Saudi The

connections identi?ed by the FBI 2:6:

- Al-Bayoumi had an accountant at the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration from

1976 to 1993, when be relocated to the United Status;

- According to the FBI. ai?Baynumi was in frequent contact thl?. the Emir a the Sand:

Ministry of rasponsiblc for air L'af'ic control;

- Th: FBI has also located rccurtls, indicating that LtI-Bayoumi receit'cd 520.000 from

the Saudi Ministry ofFinznce at one point:

ho al?Bayoumi applied to schools in the United States in 1998, he had :1 letter
from the Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was gstt'ng a full scholarship from the

of Saudi .k'a'oia; and

- While in San Diego, al?Bayoumt was racciving muncy from tho Saudi Ministry of
Defense through a Saudi company called "Emmi" ofthat company
int'onned the FBI aft-st September 2001 that, aithough al-Bayountt only showed
up at the company On one occasion. he received a saiary and incomes.
- stated that. at ?rst, he attempted to rct'us: tu pay al-Buyuumi a {nonu?tL
salary. bot he was told that his compan) would lost: their contract if he did riot pay
him. - informa?. FRI that the time, hr. atmhutr?d Whit: '0 Saudi

corruption.

Al?Boyoumi also had frcqucnt cutltaCt with Saudi it: Unitnd States. In
a rc?u'ltw ofteicphone toll records. the FBI lcamcd that aI-Bayomni called Saudi.
in the United Status almost 100 times. tictwcen January and May onUOOt

According to the FBI, al-Baynumi W15 in contact with a: least thrc: individuals 2: the Saudi

.12:

?whimsy \l'ashingtori. l-t-O indidduuls the Saudi C'uitutul .?a-Iissim?; Eu
\?t'ashington. DC. and three individuals at tin: Saudi Cnnsuiutt: in Los Angel-:2 In a search ui

Rayouzni's--, they also dis::nc:cd that it: :md t3]: phnn: numb 561' an

:ntlivic'ua! at the Saudi Consult": in London.

Ter l?nrr'iz'r San Diego apt-tits addressed the issue at. as an
of?cer at the October 9, 2001 clout-Ct itcuring. Thu futmcr Law; ug-iuzit who hansiicd

Muppet Insti?cd'

[Al-Bayoumi] ziczud liku :1 Saudi of?cer, Hi my opinion. And ifhc was
with the hijackers. Winch it looks like lit: was. ifhc signed. Izzusas, it"nc prM'idL?d
smut: 50:1. of ?nmcing it.? ofsvm: Sun. than I would 1!th than-'5 cicar
that than: might be .1 connection between Saudi Intelligcnca and

Assistant Special Agent in Charge in 153:1 Diego tcsti?cd that the FBI rccuivcd
"intuit-nuts, wnuld say half-4 aim-en" rcpons from individuals. who b'Jll'J'fiilj that al-?tta?ytiumi
wu. a. Saudi intuiligcncu of?rc: Th: Fiji's Narcmi?r' rations-3 iziconsiqtcm as tw
:11: ts :i-Rziymimt us; :i Saudi m?iigcr. it' Its
note: that until we:
Scp?Crr-?icr but tin: rsaponw aiso titu?. "11121": is no tn unwind-.- :11.

Buymmti IS a Saudi of?cer.

FBI hzui receivni Iran: :1 Sunrcc wail prim to September I I. 30?]
truncating that al-Rnyoumi might he :i SJudi of?ce: as known In
'tm'u ucuc? tu largc (if money {rant Sandi tics-pile the fact that he did not Enrica:
:1 3:211 On an: occzismn prior to Suplumbcr i 1. tit: infurmutmti that at?-

{.nunn 11nd :wm Saudi help fund at new mosque 111 Sr",
I?lu- uunductcd :1 communal-ruan :n 15% and but clan-Cd

thr: investigation at that point.

I.)

Since 11, 2001 ?131 ins-catigaticn rcvcalud that ai-Bayoumi has same tics to
terrorist elements. Pasquale J. D'Amuro. the Executive Assistant DHCCIUT for

and testi?ed in the October 9. 2002 hearing that

[w]c?vc been talking with the_ Gown-uncut about collect-.011. on an individual
named - who has tics to al?Qa'ida, who has ties to Bayoumi.

In addition. the: FBI rcportcd the results search 01'
?after an :xhaustive translations of Bayoumi?s documents, it 15 clear that Bayoumi 's
can cspondcucc he: is providing guidance to young Muslims and some of his writings can 31-.-

as jihadtst."

According to information acquired by the FBI after September 1 l, 2001. al-Bayoum: also
110th on one 01' his school applications that hi: \i'orkud I'm a. company called ?Dallalu?Avcu.?
According to the. FBI, Excan is a. San Diego subcontractor of Dallah/m'cu. According to a
separate .locumcnt. Dailuh and Avco are tittch the same- company, Avcu Dallah
Trans Aral-i, which is a subsidiary OfAl [laralzaat investment and Development Cumpany. Avco
Dull-ah holds contracts far cleaning and maintenance at litre: major in
Saudi Arabia. The - dccumcnt that
company has links to Usama Bin Ladin cadqua :crs was informcd of the affiliation
between Dallalt/Ax'co and A1 Bamkaat in szman- 2001. but the San Diego Field Ollie:

apparently never got this

According to FBI documents, al-Bayounu?s pay increased during ll]: :tmc thn: al-H 22m]
and al-Mihdhar mm: in the According to a nalysis of tics
thr? terman a?m'lcs :tm?l of the Saudi before al-Hazmi and
am'vm? in the U.S.. al-Bayoumi gt sadly approximately $465 month in
"allowances." Amending tn the. docunmnt. in Mamh 20:30, a month a?cr ul-Hazrni and al-
Milidhar arrived in San Diego. his ?zllowanccs" jumped to ovcr 53700 a mania and stayctj
constant until Dieccmber 2000, when al-Hazmi left San Diego. Al-Bnyoumi's allowances
then decreascd to approximately $3,200 a month and stayed at that rate until it] Buyaumi th:

United Statics in August 2001. approximazcly one monllt before the September llo attacks.

3.
h)
Jl

.,

Tin-memorandum dulcd July 3003.. Incorrcu?y not-5d 111.11 ul-Ihyounti's

whiic hung In Sm IJicgo. was 512011 a from Han}: Etan Sultan. ih:

will- Bundur. Ihc Saudi Ambassador :o the Uniicd Status. Th: 1-25! has new cou?zmcd

that only 05am: Bassnan's wife menu)- directly from Prince Bandus wife, but 111:1:

15'0umi's wife :o ofthc checks from Prince Bandar's wifu. which wen.-

puyalalc 10 Busman's Izi'e. into her own accounts.

Tim Joint Inquiry also found. in 3731 31:5. information Durant

may haw: also cnmuct with and

Bussnun was a van; close assocmic nmen uI-Bnyoumi's and was in lulcphonc
comma! with ni-Bayoumi several umcs day whil: they were both Sun Diego.
Bassnun also has close ties to a number Individuals to
hijackers, inciuding.I Omar szxhashnL dxscusscd hclouu who 15. in 11':

:15 Bassnan's

According to an Oczn'nL-r 1h 20m document. 1343311311 :m usac'. 11131 in
had mul Nuxmf?aI-Hunni lhrough ni-Buyuumi H: wan: or. Lu any that mm 1? of
the min-slum ltzjuckct's Omar IL- 132-; .iucumcnl. h-?s
.LIEO told the asset [Eu-.1 al-Buyvumi ?as humusc ha; know :ll-Hurmi and :11-
}ulihdhar wry We?. The document on 5211:: that ant! uI-Buyuumi

have bean 10 curh niizc.? for :1 lung tum.-

Bussnun lived the in San Dicyn acrass the stunt {mm Harv-.3

and nl-Mi?ndhar;

Rassuun mad: :1 cozmnun: to an FBI source afzcr the I .ntucks
I

that he did more for the hijackers than ul-Brajcoum" did;

- Th: FBI is awmc of:un:au1 hijackas and 2. C103: {?end ot?Bassnan's.
Khalui a airline: p510! and ccm?rd :izgln instructor living In
San Dicgu. Al-Kuycd admitted In the FBI lhui in May 2009. a] Jvfilldha: and al-

Hazmi contacted him about Ital-[ring to ?y

FBI spcculnlc that Osama Bassnan
The 18, 2002- rcspons: contends that 11:55 was
an early investigative theory based 0:1 asset reporting which the FBI has not ab?xe lo
corroborate. However, than: is 3130 additional information possibly mg Bassaan u-
in 1992, he was living in Washington, DC, Basman his employman as
the Saudi Arabian Education Mission documcnis state that?

Bassnan also has other tics L0 this Saudi Government. wk": received
from Haifa. In a recent search 131:: FBE lomicd topics at'
cashiers checks totaling during the period F?bmurg '32. 19'9") to May 30,

These checks were payable: :0 Emman?s mic and. were drawn on the Pi Bank 3.20.: um 01'
Prince Bandar's wife. The FBI has determined :im there has ham a standing ordcr on Princess
Haifa?s account since January ?999 to SZQUU a mama to Bansnan?s M?s. Bassnan's wi
was funding for "nursing services," bin, according to the - documan
27!: is no evidence that Bassnzu'l's wife provided nursing services.

On 2! feast on: occasinn, 3255mm roccived a check directly from Prince T-?mndar?s
account. According to the FBI, on May 1-1, 1998, Human ash-2d a check Bzmdar in It:
min-4:11 Bassmn's wife 3150 reached least on: 31:22:}: directly From Bandar She
alsc received on: additional chat}: from Bandar's wife. which 511: cashed or; January 5, 1998. for
$10,000.

"1

in the October 9, 2002 hearing FBI Executive Assistant Director D'Amuro conunented

0:1 this funcing:

believe that we do have money going from Bandar's wife, 52,000 a. month up to about
$64,000. What the money was for is what we don?t know"

. She gives money to a
lot of different grOups and people tom around the world. We've been able to newer a.
number of these. . .but maybe if we can discover that she gives to 20 different radical
groups. well, See, maybe there's a. pattern here.

The FBI has also devc10pcd additional inform-Laden clearly indicating that Bassoon is an
extremist and supponcr of Usama Bm Loom. In 1993, lheFBI became aware that Bassnan had
hosted a party for the Blind Shaykh at his house in Washington. DC in October 1992. Bassoon
has made many letiriatory remarks to l-?Bl assets about Bin Ladin, referring to Bin Ladin as the
of?cml Khalifatc and the ruler Islamic World Acmrdir.g to an FBI asset, spelt:
ofBin Ladin ?as ifhe were a god." Bassoon also stated to an FBI nssef that he heard that the
US Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. Ur: CU?uldCl?L?d such
measures to be insuf?cient there are. already enough Muslims the United Slates to destroy
the United States and make it an Islamic state widu'n ten to ?fteen years According to FBI
documents. Bassoon also knew Bin Ladin's family in Saudi Arabia and speaks on his mobile

telephone with members ofthe family who are living, in the United State .

Phone Numbers Linking Abu Zubaidn to a Company in the United States and a Saudi

Diplomat in Washington

On March 28, 2062 US. and c0alitmn forces retrieved the telephone book of Abu
Zu'onida. whom the US. Government has identified as :1 senior al-Qa'ida operational
coordinator According to an FBI document. ?a review ofroll records has linked several oft?ne
numbers found in Zubaida?s phonebool; with US. phone numbers." One of the numbers is

unlisted and subscribed to by the ASPCOL Comoratton in Aspen, Colorado. On July 15, 2002.

113
Wt mum?mutt?

wr oat-M t_uww

FBI Headquarters sent a lead to the Denver Field Of?ce requesting that it investigate this
connection. On September 19,2002 agents of the Denver Field Office responded. statzng that

they had completed their initial investigation.

According to the FBI's Denver Of?ce, ASPCOL IS the umbrella corporation that
manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar. the Saudi ambassador to the
United States. The facility is protected by Scimitar Security. Agent; of the Dcm?cr Field Of?c:
noted that neither no: Scimitar Security is listed in the phone book or is easily
iooatable. In addition. tho Colorado Secretory of?ce has no record The
Denver office did not attempt to make an local inquiries about ASPCOL. as they believsd that
any inquiries regarding ASPCOL would he quickly known by Prince Bender's employees. Due
to the sensitivity of this matter. they to hold then investigation of ASPCOL in abcyancc

until they received additional guidance from FBI Headquarters.

According to the FBI, the phone number of an individual nzuned? of
McLean. Virginia was found within the effects of Ahu Zttbutda. - IS reportedly :1
bodyguard an the Saudi Embassy in Washington. DC. The now suspects that it: 1:12;; be a
In :4 September l7, 2002 document, the FBI notes that the Bureau IS
opening an investigation on- due to the size and value of his residence and lus suspicious
activity in approaching U.S. Intelligence Community personnel. 1-: also appears tita-
Itits been in contact with which is located til.-
in McLean, Virginia The FBI has identi?ed this address as the address of
l'nnce Baudar. According to the 1781,- is oz'ticzuiljy' a driver for the Saudi Ezrt?nassy.
-urnber Was also linked to Prince Builder?s company located in

Colorado
It should he noted that the November 13, 2002 response states that traces

have revealed no direct (emphasis added) links between numbers found :3 Zttbaida's phone

and numbers in the United States."

lw whims??WM -

W-

The U.S. Government also located another Virginia number at Usama Bin Latlin
safchnuse in Pakistan. T312 number is subscribed to by an individual named?
was interviewed by the FBI in km
2002. He could not explain why his number ended up a safchouse in Paid 513:, but stand the:
he regularly provides survi cs to a couple: who personal assistants 1.: Prince Ban?ar This
couple?s driver is an individual who 13 asigncd to the Saudi
Embassy in Washington, DC. According to- rcgularly called?

businrss and frequently travels back and forth to Pakistan.

Other Saudi Cavernment Of?cials in the United States V?l'hn May Have Been in Contact
with the September 11 Hijackers

Among Lie indiwdunls who may haw: been assocmtes of m: al-Ilamt 2nd
was Shayi?i al-Thumairy. According to the reviewed by tin: Joint Inquiry
Staff, ?initial indications an: that al-?l?humairy may have: had a nr ?nancml cor. action in
al-l-lazmi and aJ-Mihd'nar, but w: still looking at this Aj-ilttimairy is 3:1
accreditcd diplomat at tin: Saudi Consulate in 1.0: and is also one of thc?:
"mums" at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City. Calil?omia.

According 10 docmnents, King Fahad mosque was built it l998 from ?nding
from Lil: Saudi Arabim Crown Prince Abdulaziz. Th: mosque is attended by anemiach of the
Saudi Consulate in Ins and IS widely known for its anti?Wastcm news. FBI
indicate that Mal:th Abdullah drove al-Ilazmi and to I?m: King Fahad

Mosque. befor: al-Nlihdhar returned to Saudi Arabia.

Several individuals on th: East Coast when] :11: hijackars may have met may. also had
to ill: Saudi Gm'cmrucnt. After the terrorist attacks. 121:: FBI discuvcrmi that. during;
September 2001,:1n individual named Salsh al-li'ussaycn 51:)ch a: the Hunt: hntc?: 1r. Hcmdotz,
Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying at the time. Aczmding to PB: down-cuts al- Ilussaycn is

apparently a ?Saudi intuit-tr Ministry :mployce/n?izjal ile chimed not to 1-2::er the. hijackers.

.n
A 3?

W4

:4

u: agents in the FBI's Washington Field Of?ce believed he was being deceptive. The interview
was [emanated when al-H?ussaycn :ilhsr passed out or a seizure requiring medical

He was rclcascd from the hospital days later and managed to dcpui?. the

United States ticngite law enforcement efforts to locate and rc-imcwizw him.

Salch al-llusxaycn is the uncle ofSum: Omar al-Hthsaycn. San-.i al-l-lussayen is
comic:ch to the Islamic Atilc?ca (IANA) and is the subject m'au
couzitciterrorism investigation. The: FBI has also that Sulcii al-I-l?ussa?u is a major
contributor to 1.11: LANA, a non-pro?t organization based in lt-llclugun that is dedicath to 11::
spread oflslum worldwid 0. According to the FBI, the mission is actually to spread
Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the Unlch Slults and the world at
large. The solicits funds from wealthy Saudi benefactors Islamic Shay-libs. and
suspect non-govmmental organizations. According to documents. IANA has solicited
mom-y from Price: Bandm?, but the documents are unclear as to whethc: Bunch: actually

money to this orgmtizstion

[?51 documents also indicate that sevcral Seed; Naval of?cers were in contact wits tit:
September ll hijackers. suite that the San Dicgn l-?icld Office opciied
owestigalion on an individual named Osama Mach. .1 Saudi Naval officer, due
to his association with Nawaf al-Huzmi and Khalid al-Mihdlzar. Lu addition. 35 al Harbi,
anotth Saudi Naval officer, was in telephonic contact with flight Khalid al-Mihdhur

and Plat of al?llazmi on nine occasions from March 11, 2000 :0 March 27, 2000.

The aclcsom'illc FBI Field Of?ce is conducting an investigation to determine whether
53ch: Ahnmc? Bedaiwi, Saudi Naval of?ce: within its tcuitory was in cor?uct with any
anaem-

u?

WI whom?Hum"

The F31 has also discovered some more tenuous connections Saudi Government

personnel and the hijackers during the course ofthc investigation. For example.

ccm?ding to the FBI, an individual named Faltati Abdullah Saich Baitztio was close friends With
September 1 1 hijackers Airtted and i-Iomm Baku}: prevmusiy Orketl
a: a pilot for the Saudi Royal family, ?ying Usama Bin Ladin Afghanistan and Saudi
Arabia during UBL's exile." In addition, an FBI source state-:1 after 1 that he/she
mus 50% sure that was a warm at an apartment in McLean Virginia that was
Occupied in July and August 2001 by Hamad Alotaibi of the Saudi Embassy Division.
FBI documents also note that September 1 i him-tor Raced Aighamdi may have also the

address.

Connections Between Saudi Government Officials in the United States and Other I?oasihlc
Terrorist Operatives

Joint Inquiry also reviewed information in FBI Eics, suggesting other possible

connections between Saudi Government of?cials and tenonst Op?r?liVCS,

For example. according to FBI documents, then.- is evidence that hi} suitors Mot-wan al-
Shc'nhi and Mohammad ALLJ were in contact with B'Iohantmei Ra?que Qundir tiic
su'nject of an FBI counterterror'xn it: 'cstigation since 1999 351d a uiuse :msoctat: ofAbduliai;
Bin Ladin. who is referred to in FBI documents as Usame Bin Ladtrt's half brother. Abe-111m
Bin Ludin, who is the subject of soviet-:11 FBI investigations, is. currently in the United States.
He claims for
'he Saudi Ambit-J! Embassy in Washington, DC as an administrative of?cer. Alm?uiia?tt Bin Ladit:
has ?nanced Qttudir's company and is listed by Quadir as the emergency contact for Quodix's

children. They an: in ?cquent email and phon: contact as wail

?w 43*

Aecording to the FBI. Abdullah Bin Ladin has a number of connections to terrorist
organizations. He is the President and Director of the World Arab Muslim Youth Assaciation
and the Institute of leamic and Arabic Sciences in America Both organizations are
local branches ofnon-govemmental organizations (N605) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that is "closely associated with the
funding and ?nancing of international terrorist actiwties and in the past has provided logistical
support to indmduals wishing to ?ght in the Afghan War." In 1998, the CIA published :1 paper
characterizing WAMY a NGO that provides funding, logistical Support and training with
connections to the Arab Atghans network. Hamas. Algerian extremists. and Philippine

- - 2
militants.

Also of potential intereSL at least in retrospect, is the 1999 incident involving Mohammed
al-Qudhaeein and Hamdan al-Shalawi. Al-Qudhaecir. and nl-Shalttwi were ?ying from Phoenix
to Washington, DC to attend a patty at the Saudi Embassy. After they boarded the plane in
Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questioras about the ?ight that the
flight attendants found suspicious. When the plate was in ?ight, al?Qudhueeir. asked where the
hathroorn was: one of the ?ight attendants pointed him to the back of the plane. Nevertheless,
al-Qudhacein went to the front of the plane and attempted on two occasions to enter the cockpit.
The plane made an emergency landing and the FBI tnvestigateo' the metdent, but decided not to
pursue a prosecution A: the tune, al-Qudhrtecin and al-Shalawi claimed that the Saudi Embassy

paid for their airplane tickets.

After the FBI discovered that an individual in Phocmx who was the subject of a
cottntenetrorism investigation was driving ?-Sltalnwi's car, the Bureau Opened :1
countez'terrorism investigation on ul?Shalawi. In November 2000. the FBI received reporting
that al-S'nalawi had trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had
received explosives training to perform "Khohat attacks. After the September 11,
2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Off: ee attached even potentially greater signi?cance to that 1999 I

tncident. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory behind this. ?Phoenix FBI now

to the FBl's Nevmnber 18, ?002 Ilthougl: Several of?cials In WAMY support al-Qa?ida and
other tmonst groups. the tnlciligenc: is insuf?cient to Show whethe: the organization as a wimle and its senior
leadership support

433

believes bum wort: specifcaily attempting to the security procudurcs of America

Airlines in preparation for and in furtherance of UBUAI Qusda operations."
in testimony be For: the Ioint Inquiry, agcnt who drafted the ?Phonrtix stated:

In a post 9/11 world. back and Eonkai at timt as possibly bcing some sort of dry
run. It is currently unticr

September 11.2002. Mumm?

[rt interviews, a Phoenix FBI agent stated that Phoctnx
bciicvcd that ai-Qudhazcin bc His pru?lc is. similar to that of
ai-Bayoumi and Bassnan. He is in 111:: United States as a student amt (30:5 not have a visibl:
means ofincorn: H: is in contact With Saudi Govrmnict estzhiisitrnents i: the United
Stat-CS and appcars to be very involvczi in the 1f fair; of the local Saudi Iii: runs a
?Saudi Club" in Phoenix, and assists Saudi students in the area. The FBI has 2150 developed
information that aZ-Qudhaeciu was receiving money from the Saudi Government but. as of
August 2002, had not obtained the rcicvunt bank rccords for 'I?hc FBi's Phoenix Fich

Of?cu has Sprculatcd that and others may be

arc other indications in FBI files that cicmcuLs Saudi Gox'cmuicnt may have
prrwidori supan tn terrorist! network: For example, 1hr FBI had "19 Tim Tnmiyah
Mosque in Culver City :15 :1 site activity both bciutt: and site; September 11.
Several subjects ofSan Diego investigation prior to September 1] had close connections to the
mosque. Bwed on intervich and review ofFBi mes, San Diego FBI believed at th: timc
that these subjects were laundering monsy through this mosqu: ?rst to Somali non-profit

organizations and then to entities af?liated with Tsuma Bin Ladir.

VJ

in approximately 1998. the FBI became aware of millions of dollars in wire transfers
from the Somali community in San Diego to Al Barnkaat Trading Company and other businesses
af?liated with Usarna Bin Ladin. At the time, the funding appeared to be originating ?ow the
local Somali wmmunity in the form of donations to various Somali non-pro?ts. However, the
FBI now believes that the some of the funding actually originated from Saudi Arabia and that
both the Ibn Ismiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego Were
involved in laundering the money.

According to the format FBI agent in San Diego who was irrvolVed in this investigation,
this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide nl~Qa'ida with ?mding through covert
or indirect means. In his October 9, 2002 testimony the {cutter agent commented on the possible

money laundering:

My guess Saudi-it's connected somehow with the Saudis. And knowing that probably

70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Bin Ladin, it might be an

indication.

There are also indications of Saudi governmental support for terrorist activity through
charitable organizations. The'Saudi-bascd Umm al-Qura Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is
an Islamic organization linked to terrorist suppon activities. According to a
May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary, the UQ's activities in support of terrorism
include: suspicious money transfers, document forgery. providing jobs to wanted terrorist
suspects, and ?nancing travel for youths to attendjihad training. The Defense communication
notes that since September 2001. UQ couriers have transported over $330,000 in cash, most of
which they received from Saudi Embassies in the Far East in county 2002. UQ administrator
Yassir El-Sayid Moliamrned traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately $200,000 from the
Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, the personal assistant to the HQ
administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He
tetumed with tens of thousands of dollars. according to the Department of Defense.

CIA. Treasury, and FBI of?cials have all expressed their concern about the al-Hararnain

Foundation's ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity. According to the PB I?s

435

November 18, 200?. rCSponSe, the al-i-Iaratnain Islamic Foundation (HIP) has clear ties to the
Saudi Government. and intelligence reporting suggests it is providing ?nancial and logistical
support to al-Qa'ide. In 1993, established its U.S.-ba.scd u?ice in Oregon, and that
office has since received approximately $700,000 from the patent. of?ces in Saudi Arabia. The
FBI has apencling investigation oleF and the activities ol'the Portland Of?ce. As
above. the FBI has located correspondence between al-Bayourni and the HIP. From
the documents, it is clear that HIP was intercst in appointing the imam of the mosque in Cajou.

California, that al-Bayourni managed.
The Treasury General Counsel testi?ed about his agency's concern about the foundation:

MR. SceOnd, and this is important poznl. it also rises out nfRiclz's
testimony, on al-Haramain. the two branch of?ces that we took a public and joint action
againSI, al-I-iaramain really does represent a signi?cant issue for the FCC and for terrorist
?nancing and for the United States policy. It 25, of course. the largest, 1 the largest
Islamic charity in the world. its name is synonymous with charity in the Islamic world.
Its direct overseers are members of the Royal Family; signi ?ennt contriburors are
members of the Royal Family. We don?t have a great deal of intelligence on the
headquarters, about whether they are knowingly assisting peopie in al?Qa'tda and others;
but in signi?cant branch of?ces yet to be designated and under current investigation, we
have ample evidence that large cash amounts 3: being courierec'. to these branch of?ces.
that large wire translate of money are being sent to those oltices. that a great deal of the
money is being dissipated through miSSpenrling. unaccounted for, and ?nally. that those
of?ces have signi?cant contacts with extremists, Islamic extremists.

CIA of?cials recently testi?ed :bat they are making progress on their investigations of at

A year ago we had a lot ofreporting suggestmg branch of?ces were tied to al-
the last year we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement
information and we prepared a paper about a month, six weeks ago which assembled all
of paper gave us the ?rst clear indication that the head nl'the central of?c: is
complicit in supponing terrorism, and it also raised questions about Prince Nayef.

Finally, -, the subject of Phoenix and Portland counterterrorisrn
investigations. also has close ties to a member of the Saudi royal family. - no longer

resides in the United States. but is still the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI opened an

wr smut-?WW

investigation of- an employee cfSaudi Arabian Airlines, in 1999 after receiving
information_ that Bin Ladin lieutenant Ahu Zitbaitia had been
in contact with a telephone number associated with- in Portland. in May 2001, two
individuals were arrested in Bahrain anti later admitted they were on their Way to blow up US
facilities in Saudi Arabia. One lud a passport that had liter. mscud to on: of-
-Tne FBl's Phoenix Field Other: also received source reporting in 1999 that -
was checking security at the Southwest border and discussing. the possibility of infiltrating

individuals into the United States.

The FBI has develOpct?. information that_ 1:215 (2105:: ties with one ofthe Saudi
princes and accompanies him on many trips. including travel to the United States. According to
the was recently interrogated at the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay. Tie informed the FBI that- got the so at Saudi Arabian Airlines through
his contacts. He said that- did not cam much money in thisjoh, but that he "had another
source of income through a Saudi prince" named Khalid m-Eiantmr. Aczording to -
performed miscellaneous tasks for the Prince, such as handling. real estate matters
and assisting the Prince's grandmother. - traVelm many places with the Prince, including
Europe, and often to the United Arab Emirates. made the comment
that nobody ?knew everything a?oout-" Although his name was on the State.
Dcpa?ment?s watc'nlist,_ was apparently able to Circuziivcn: the Customs Service
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service because he was traveling With the Saudi prince,
The FBI only learned of the trip after the fact. Agents in the l'Bi's Portland Field Office
their concern that- rind others were using their status as Saudi Arabian
:Urlines employees as a cover to enable. them to transport weapons in and an: ofthe United

States.
Lack ul'Saudi Cooperation in Counter-terrorism Investigations
In testimony and interviews, a number of FBI agents and CIA of?cers complained to the

Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi Cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after

the September 1 attacks. For example, a veteran New York FBI agent stated that, From his

?u ?37

point of view, the Saudis have been naeless and obstructionist for years. In this agent?s opinion,
the Saudis will only act when it is in their self-interest.

When a high-level - of?cer was asked how the September 1 attacks might have been
prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation, pointing to an example ?om the summer of 2001,
when the US. Government requested Saudi assistance, with no success. In May 2001, the US.
Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Abu Zubaida
and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qa'ida operation. The US. Government pressured
the Saudi Government to locate him. The Saudis informed tho U.S. Government that they
required additional information to do so. The US Government agency that had originally
learned of this individuals knowledge rc?rsed to provide the Saudis with additional information
because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tried to
pressure the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without the additional information.

According to some FBI personnel, this type of response is typical from the Saudis. For
example. one FBI agent described one investigation atter September 1 in which he provided the
Saudi Government with capies of the subjects? Saudi passports. The Saudi GOV/eminent
maintained that they had no record of the subjects.

According to the format Chiefof Alec Station, the unit in the DCI's

Center established in 1996 to focus speci?cally on Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from about
1996 that the Saudi Gavernrnent would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating
to Usarna Bin Ladin. There is a May 1996 memo from the DCl's Countertermrist Center-
- stating that the Saudis had stopped providing background information or other assistance on
Bin Ladin because Bin Ladin had "too much information about o?icial Saudi dealings with
Islamic extremists in the 19808 for Riyadh to deliver him into US. hands." In a June 1997
memo to the DCL Alec Station reernphasizcd the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there
was little prospect of future cooperation regarding Bin Ladin The former Chief of Alec Station
thought that the U3. Severnment?s hope of eventually obtainingSandi cooperation was
unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the US. Government on this matter was contrary to Saudi

national

wt whom?mum? 433

testi?ed on this issue on October 9?

0n the issue of al-Qa?ida and Saudi intelligence. that goes back to our eEorts to interact
with the Saudi to get them to help us on investigating al-Qa?ida. ..for the most part it was
a very trouwa relationship where the Saudis were not providing us quickly or very
vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn't. It was just
very slow in coming.

Both FBI and CIA personnel cited an individual nnmod Madani as a speci?c
case in which theSaudis were uncooperative. The CIA and the FBI had been pressuring the
Saudis for years for permission to talk to at-Tayyib. According to the fonner head of ALEC
Station, ai-Tayyib managed all of Bin Indin?s ?nances when Bin Lmlin was in Sudan, and any
expense over $1,000 had to be approved by al-Tayyib. Al-Tayyib moved to London in 1996 to
work with Khalid al-Fawwaz, another important al~Qa?ida ?gure who has since been arrested 1n
the summer of 1996. al-Tayyab returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continuously refused the
and the requests to talk to al-Tayyib, stating, in the words of an FBI agent. that al-
Tayyih was ?just a poor man who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything."

The former chief of Alec Station also cited the example of Mohammad Jamal Khalifa.
Khalifa is Bio Ladin's brother-inlaw and an important ?gure in al-Qa?ida. The U5.
Govunment arrested Khalifa in the United States in 1994. Khalifa had been sentenced to death
in absenu'a by the Jordanian Government for his role in a bombing in Jordan. As a result, the
US. agreed to extradite him to Ionian. The Jordanians then remmed him to Saudi Arabia. In the
opinion of the CIA o?'icer, the Saudis ?bought oft? the Jordanians for the return of Khalit?a.
According to the CIA of?cer. when Khalifa subsequently arrived in Saudi Arabia, he was met by
at least one important government of?cial Khalit?a now works for a Riyadh-based N60 and
travels and operates freely.

The General Counsel of the US. Treasury testi?ed at the July 23, 2002
hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation with the U.S.:

I.

439

is an almost intuitive 50:19:, how-wet, that things are not being x'alurtecrcti. So I
want to fully tnfom?t you about 11. that we have to ask and we have to sock and w: have TO
strive. 1' will give you The :"usl is, amt: 50m: traded. the Saudis
have agreed to tho designation ofa man named Iuluytlirt, who I: notoriously involve-d in
all of this; and his Will be public within the next 10 days. Tho}r cam: {onward
to us 2 weeks ago and said, okay, we thin}; we should go forward will; I'm; dosigttutmu
and a freeze order against M: Julnydin. We aq?rrcd, what do you "mm: on him? Because
they certainly know what we have on him. becausa we shared it as w: tried to convince
them that they ought to join us. The answer back was. nothing new.

3-13.. BEREUTER: Do you believ: that?

MB. AUFIIAUSER. No. think that taxes crcdulity, or (1151': is another mottv: we an: no:

being told.

Status of the LES. Intelligence Community?s Investigations into Connections
Terrorism and Saudi Government Of?cials

Both the FBI and the CU. have informed the Cort-unittces ?zat tlxy are treating the Saudi

senously. to November 18, 2001 F81 response. the FBI and CIA have

cstablishcd a working group to look into the Saudi issue. The FBI formed it squad at the

Field Of?ce_ to tmcmigate issuc antl-

l'l'i ll

*mvwl?w-mm'

?unit?mow

both the FBI and 2h: CIA stili have only :a limiL-zai understanding oflhe Semi:
Govcmm: nt'a tics Lo In October 9, 2002 closed healing. Dircctor Mueller

Slated:

Ifl have one pmiimiuary note efcaution. it is that at this point than: arc more: questions

than and 1 would caution againstjumping to conciusmns bctorc we know 3 Eur

more.

A document Ioaatcd by the Jninl Inquiry '1 fcon?rms that the 1-1ch
Of?cc is still in th: early stages offecusing uu 1.11:5: inv?kigmions. In an Augusi 15, 2002,
communication, a ?eld of?ce: agent 51:1th that
in
that same document, the Washington Field Of 3'10: asked?

?_enms

{mummy that I'm- nfthis issue is limited as well:

With regard [0 1h: spaci?c QUESIIOH of have we seen the Saudi Intelligence Senna-5
supponing Icrror goups, I think the rccord is not clear at 311 01?. that.

Both Eh: FBI and CIA recognized the that indix annals connected to the Saudi

may be providing support to Icrmrists.

So (1?.ch is certainly a good, good chance: that than: an: ur extremists,
sympathich possibly for al-Qn?ida within the Secumy services.

also {mind that

Abu Zubayduh said he?s con?dent that aI-Qa?ida mus: have. warm: usrtm'nly W111: Saudis

the Unich States and that ul-Qa'ida and Usama Hin Ladin at: they

.o
?W-Mwuw-w

izwest sigm?canl energy in cultivating what Abu Zubaytlah called good relationships
with Saudis ofai?l Standing? .He said hin Lndin 15 very plossad when Saudis in the
military, those successful in business. and those close to the royal family to lend active
support to his cause. He said bir. Ladin actively seeks out such relALiC-nships

Other CLA. and P151 of?cials echoed these remarks in recent Congressional testimony.

l?smw:

What we ?nd troubling about the cases that we loomed about from FBI. both the Los
Angelo: cases and some of the cases that the Washington Field Of?c: has look-Led at, it;
which you?re Seeing Saudi money gomg to peeple. is that it ?ts sort ofa pattern that
we?ve seen in terms ofdirect payments li'orn the Saudis, the Sunni Government's
longstanding support for vow ftmdameotalist Wahabi and Sala? charities amt movements
around the world, which in a sense you so: the money is going to fundamentalists and
you would be very surprised if some of it doesn't bleed over into terrorist
had a lot ofsuspicions before September 11 which we documuutcd in :1
number of different papers, and again it?s :1 lot of smoke and the issues that come up
who knows about the payments, on whose behalfare the payments hemg made, are they
being made on behalf of the central or a: litey hem-g, made by a local of?cial
or a person. Dr: the people who are making the payments know What's happening to the
money? lfthey do know What?s happening, why are they making the payments? Is it a
form of blackmail? Do they recognize the terrorist support? There's the issue of are they
regulating themsnivcs as well as are they doing the due diligence that they ought to.

FEE Executive Assistant Director Pas ualc D'Amuro testi?ed :12. 121.1: same hearing:
Cl

To date I can't sit here and tell you that those I.th go back. that we can prove that the
Saudi loyal famin is sponsoring, terro?sm. But there?s enough smoke that we are
conducting chef?l investigations to try to determine what other information is out there.

What :5 clear is that FBI did not treat the Saudis as a counter-terrorism.

utrcat prior to September 11. 2001.

?2

Michael Rolincc, the former head of the International Terrorism Oprmtions Section at

rcsn?tied:

The answer to your question is pro-9111 there were not any signi?cant preliminary
inquiry or full investigations, with relatively few exceptions. conducted by the FBI
looking at Saudi or support to terror ism. . .I'm not going to stand
here, Ms. Hill, and tell you in any Way, shape or form

The former Special Agcnt in Chargc in San Diego con?nncd this in his

Basican?-
were not a country idcoti?cd by the Slat: Spartmont as a state sponsor of torron'sm.

And the theme or the: common modus operandi that w: saw in San Diego was that if than:
were_ there, primary o'njcotive was to monitor dissidents in
interost of promoting the royal family. So they wort: not viewed as an ittimicd throat to
nnttona'. sccunty.

In the October 9, 2002 closed lrcan'ng. Dircztor Mu:li:: acknowledg? that he became
aware ofsornc oFthc facts regarding the Saudi issue only a; a result ot?thc investigative work of

:11: Joint Inquiry Staff:

I'm saying the soqucuce of events hare, I thin}: the staff probed and. as :1 result oftiv:
probing, Some facts cam: to light hon: and to ms, ?mt'ily, the: had not some to light
before, and perhaps would not have come to light had the staft'nm probed. 'Etat's what
I?m telling you. So I?m agreeing with you that the staff probing brought out facts that
may not have come to this Cort?trrtit?M

Huh.

Senator Dcwinc: But what you?re also saymg. though. is that that probing than brought

facts to your ancntiorr.

Director Muelicr: Yes.